Agenda item

6.1

The Council received a presentation from the Chief Executive of the Council, John Mothersole and the Director of Housing and Neighbourhoods, Janet Sharpe on the work undertaken to review the safety of tower blocks in the city, following the tragic fire at Grenfell Tower in Kensington and Chelsea. The presentation was followed by an opportunity for Members of the Council to ask questions.

6.2

There were matters that were known in relation to the fire at the Grenfell Tower, including that it was a 24 storey building, with a single central staircase and that a composite aluminium material rain-screen cladding with thermal insulation had been installed in 2015/16. It was also confirmed that gas was installed in the tower block.

6.3

There were also things which were not known at this time, particularly in relation to how the fire had taken hold and had spread so quickly, the management of the building, any outstanding actions from the London Fire service in relation to its safety and the exact details of the scope of the Inquiry into the tragedy.

6.4

In Sheffield, there were 24 Tower Blocks, all of which were externally clad, 14 of these were completed over 15 years ago. Three were clad in brick at Stannington and 21 with a rain-screen cladding system.  20 Tower Blocks had solid Aluminium metal cladding with a mineral type insulation, one block had an aluminium composite material (ACM) on its outer leaf that was sent down to the Government for testing. The other 20 tower blocks were clad in solid aluminium. It was confirmed that a testing programme was underway to finally confirm this. All 24 tower blocks had benefited from extensive fire stopping and compartmental works which commenced in 2010 and were now completed as part of the Council’s 5 year Fire Safety Programme which included the provision of compartmentation works,  external fire breaks and fire retardant insulation. One tower block, which was sheltered housing, had a sprinkler system installed. There was a ‘Stay Put’ Policy in place for all blocks, which had been agreed with South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service. All blocks had annual Fire Risk Assessments in placeand benefited from regular checking every 6 weeks. A commitment had been made by the Council to consult with tenants and residents to install sprinklers in all Tower Blocks as further re-assurance to tenants.

6.5

One Tower Block in Sheffield, the Hanover Tower, had failed the new Government test on one element of the cladding. The block, comprising 126 flats and a single staircase had been refurbished in 2012 and a three-part cladding system was installed. There were fire stopping measures in the block which had also been subject to an independent fire safety quality check in 2010 and through annual Fire Risk Assessments. The design and build had been contractor led and the Council was clarifying why composite material was chosen to install to the outer leaf. However, this complied with Building Regulations.

6.6

Meetings had been held with Tenants and Leaseholders and the cladding was to be removed, during which time there would be 24 hour security in place. People would be offered temporary rehousing and consultation would take place to choose new cladding for the block. All tenants and their safety regardless of tenure was a priority for the City.

6.7

Other buildings, including those used by other institutions and the private sector were also being looked at and it was known that the Stephenson wing of the Children’s Hospital had failed the new test on cladding and it would be removed. Other types of building which were being looked at in conjunction with the South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service included schools, private sector rented accommodation, university student accommodation, housing association, office and hotel buildings.

6.8

Information was being collected from the public and private sector to create baseline data and a single city database was in development, in conjunction with the South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service.  The Council was seeking Government funding to address current actions and to install additional protection and regular updates were being provided to the Government.

6.9

Members of the Council asked questions relating to the presentation and responses were given by the Chief Executive and the Director of Housing and Neighbourhoods, as summarised below:

6.10

In response to question about the installation of sprinkler systems, Members were informed that there were mixed views regarding the use of sprinklers. There were different types of sprinkler system and the Council intended to install sprinklers if supported by tenants and residents but would first consult on a block by block basis. The tragic events at the Grenfell Tower would mean that once the outcome of the inquiry was completed it was likely that all local authorities would have to work through any recommendations. The City Council was highly responsible in the management of its estate and was seeking to clarify matters with regard to the Hanover block.   The Council had made assurances to tenants and leaseholders at the Hanover block that it would work on options for replacement claddingwith them. There would be a timescale for the procurement and delivery of the new cladding system, although it was not intended that the building would be without cladding for an undue length of time.

6.11

The planning process alone was not adequate to consider in detail issues such as fire safety, although it was used to the extent that it could be legitimately. It was important to make sure good fire safety was designed into a building, but the planning process was limited to the extent that it could determine product or materials except if a building had listed status. One of the issues arising from the Grenfell tragedy might be the extent to which planning and building regulations might be used differently. Works undertaken to housing stock had to ensure that improvements and specifications met the relevant building standards. Sometimes design work was done by a contractor and at other times by a Council architect. Members were informed of such schemes as were tenants and leaseholders and Members were also offered briefings to help them respond to queries from local residents.

6.12

In relation to the level of confidence in current fire safety and building regulations, there was usually a high level of trust in state regulations. However, there was a question over how a product which had passed building regulations had now been found to have failed the new Government test. It could be that either a different test had been used or that the regulations being used were confusing or not adequate. Confidence in the measures in place and regulation might come out of the Inquiry if there was shown to be a process of learning.

6.13

The Council had a number of responsibilities which it had to perform under regulations to make sure tenants and properties were kept safe. The Council had a strong relationship with the Fire and Rescue Service. Annually, there was a joint inspection of all blocks of flats owned by the Council which also did its own checks. Six weekly inspections were carried out to help ensure safety and there were specific deadlines in relation to any works to properties.

6.14

A question was asked in relation to whether the South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service had the necessary funding and equipment to respond to such an incident and this would be referred to the Fire Rescue Service for a response.  The Government would also be asked to provide resources to put in place the necessary safety work and measures.

6.15

In relation to the response of the local authority to an event such as that relating to the Grenfell Tower, the City Council did undertake emergency planning exercises, although reality was often different to training. Exercises were scenario based and included a debriefing process. The Council also reviewed its responses to real occurrences, such as with the floods in 2007. As to whether the City could cope with the scenario faced by Kensington and Chelsea, there was capacity to re-home several hundred people, based on the fact that the Council was itself a large landlord and also had in place strong partnerships.

6.16

Whilst the Council had most power in relation to the residential sector, this was less so for the education and business sector, unless a building was in structural danger of collapse. The Council had offered schools access to the independent testing it was putting in place. Although the Council would not fund testing for the school, it would facilitate them gaining access to it.

6.17

The ‘Stay Put’ policy was advice and people would always make their own judgements. The Fire and Rescue Service advise that, on balance, it was appropriate to follow the ‘Stay Put’ policy on the basis of inspections of each tower block. The advice would depend on a particular building and the Inquiry relating to the Grenfell fire would establish whether or not a Stay Put policy was correct in that case.  

6.18

As regards, the use of particular cladding materials and evidence relating to fire breaks, buildings behaved as whole and in relation to fire, it was important to deal with prevention of fire, containment and preventing the spread of fire.

6.19

Sprinklers were installed in a sheltered tower block at Gleadless Valley and fire stopping works had been carried out in other sheltered housing accommodation and all other Council owned accommodation in the City. Sprinklers and misting systems were used in accommodation for highly vulnerable people who could not evacuate a building themselves. The Council was, in conjunction with the Fire and Rescue Service, reviewing whether any additional measures were required. 

6.20

The emergency planning service was a joint arrangement with Rotherham Borough Council and it applied to back office support and resilience. There were activities which were specific to Sheffield, such as the allocation of Forward Liaison Officers and Duty Chief Officers. The Sheffield specific functionality was not compromised by the joint arrangement.

6.21

It was acknowledged that the events at the Grenfell Tower affected tenants and leaseholders in Sheffield. The Council had provided information the day following that event and was talking to tenantsand residents. There had been a comprehensive programme of drop-in sessions, information and liaison and people were also asking questions and getting answers from other expertise, including the Fire and Rescue Service. Working together with the Cabinet Member, there was also a programme of consultation. People wanted to see the results of testing on cladding and material which were being communicated as the results of the tests were confirmed. It was important that people’s questions were answered so they felt confident.

6.22

It was important to obtain a city-wide picture of the condition of high rise buildings and the Council had a duty in relation to buildings for which it was responsible and was asking questions about other buildings. For example, the Council was liaising with the City’s Universities in relation to student accommodation blocks.

6.23

Fire-stopping measures had been installed in low and medium rise sheltered accommodation for vulnerable people and some had sprinklers. This had been done as part of a five year programme which had now come to an end. The Council had said that it would review the use of sprinklers and was working with the Fire and Rescue Service to consider proposals. There were behavioural issues which might contribute to safety in tower blocks and it was part of tenancy conditions to make sure that the behaviour of one person did not put others at risk.

6.24

In relation to the Hanover Tower, the Council would clarify why top level records stated that aluminium composite cladding had been installed in one tower block whereas, cladding on other blocks installed by the same contractor was solid aluminium. The cladding product used on Hanover Tower was legal and had passed the relevant standard.

6.25

The Council did not intend to ask leaseholders to contribute to the costs of cladding workswhen it was re-clad. The Council would look at the issue of insurance for tenants and leaseholders and also seek clarification from the Government.

6.26

Fire risk assessments included checks on fire doors. There were a small number of leaseholder properties where there was an option for the leaseholder or the Council to install a fire door and the cost would be met by the leaseholder. This matter was subject to a legal process to bring it to a conclusion so that all doors fully comply.

6.27

Consultation regarding sprinklers would take place after the summer and consultation would be on a block by block basis.

6.28

It was the Council’s view that the Government should pay for the works necessary. However, work would not be delayed whilst the Council waited for the Government to deal with the matter of cost.

6.29

As regards the possibility of installing additional stairs, nothing would be ruled out at this point in time. However, there were issues to be dealt with in the immediate time following the Grenfell Tower tragedy; the Council would then deal with the issue of sprinkler systems, following which other potential measures could be assessed.

6.30

There had been incidents of fires in flats. Two had occurred in the Hanover Tower and both had been contained. There were approximately 65 fires annually and all of these were treated very seriouslybut the fire stopping work installed had contained the fires on all occasions.

6.31

Further information on what the Council was doing with regard to fire safety would be made available, including on the Council website.

6.32

It was proposed that consultation would take place at the same time in relation to sprinklers and bin chutes.

6.33

In response to question concerning the use of UPVC windows, Members were informed that Windows were an integral part of cladding systems. There were timber framed windows in 3 tower blocks and plans were in place to replace them.

6.34

Prior to the fire at Grenfell Tower, the Council and South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service had a programme of activity to ascertain how close the Fire Service could get to Tower Blocks and with regard to access. There were some issues which needed to be addressed concerning the parking of cars around blocks and the work to improve access was underway.

6.35

There was specific advice regarding what people should do in the event of a fire. Literature would be adapted to reflect the type of home that people lived in.

6.36

Joint inspections regarding fire safety were carried out with the Fire and Rescue Service and there was work such as to door closers that was done as part of that programme. Checks were being carried out to make sure there were no works outstanding and that all works previously identified had been completed in accordance with what the Fire Service had requested.

6.37

In relation to other buildings, such as hotels, the Council’s primary role was in relation to the design and planning process. Developers may use an independent building control provider. Responsibility with regard to fire safety passed to the Fire and Rescue Service, which carried out regular checks of hotels.

6.38

It was proposed that sprinkler systems would include the public areas of Tower Blocks and individual flats within those buildings.

6.39

Periodic visits were made to tenants as part of the new Housing Service operating model and if an individual was hoarding material, which might present a problem, this was in breach of their tenancy condition and officers would work with that person to clear a property. Multi-agency work was also carried out with families.

The Council noted the information reported in relation to the review of Tower Blocks in Sheffield and thanked the Chief Executive and Director of Housing and Neighbourhoods for their presentation and for their responses to Members’ questions.